Secret	
	3.5(c)



Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism

3.5(c)

6 April 1976

Secret 95

3.5(c)

6 APR 1976



Approved	for Release:	2018/10/01	C02630604
	CEA	BCT .	

WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT

CONTENTS

	0 April 1970	
NR		,
1	Terrorist Threats and Plans	TAB B
NR		

3.5(c)

SECRET

3.5(c)























SECRET

3.5(c)

Targets: U.S. EMBASSY ** The "Red Brigade of Workers Power" is planning a terrorist Place: Argentina campaign beginning 2 April against several targets, one Date: April 1976 of which is the U.S. mission in Argentina 3.3(b)(1)

(Comment: Little is known about the above group, but it is believed to have killed some Buenos Aires policemen in recent days.)

3.5(c)

NR

B-I-2

SECRET

3.5(c)

SECRET

Target: U.S. CITIZEN

Place: Argentina,

Cordoba

Date: Late April 1976

** The mother of a U.S. citizen residing in Cordoba received an extortion threat on 26 January when an unidentified caller threatened that her daughter would be killed if he were not paid \$50,000 by 24 April. The mother has only recently advised authorities in the U.S. of this threat. The State Department considers this a serious threat and has informed the embassy in

3.5(c)

Buenos Aires.

3.5(c)

NR

SECRET 3.5(c)

B-I-3

6 AP 375



















Seeret 3.5(c)



Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism


3.5(c)

13 April 1976

Secret 95

c) 13 APR 1975

3.5(c)



Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C02630604	
SECRET	3.5(c)
	()

WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT

CONTENTS

JCR Policy Meeting Inter Raid (Page 4)	rupted by Argentine Pol	ice
Paraguay Arrests Terrori Argentina (Page 6)	st Suspects Returning f	rom









Approved	for Release:	2018/10/01	C02630604
	TOT INCIDASE.	2010/10/01	C02030004

CECHT	
38666	

JCR Policy Meeting Interrupted By Argentine Police Raid

On 29 March the Argentine federal police conducted a raid on an estate in Moreno, Buenos Aires province, and interrupted a top-level policy conference of the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR). The conference, which began on 27 March and was scheduled to end on 30 or 31 March, included representatives of JCR member organizations-the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary left (MIR), the Bolivian National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Uruguayan National Liberation Movement/Tupamaros (MLN/T).

The conference was conducted without the prior knowledge of the owner of the estate. When he became aware of the meetings he informed the federal police. On 29 March the police sent a group of plainclothed officers to investigate. As the federal and local police approached the estate, the insurgents opened fire. While the police awaited reinforcements from the police and army, at least six ERP members escaped, including ERP leader Mario Roberto Santucho and Juan Mangini, ERP intelligence chief in Tucu-Seven to eleven of the participants were killed during the exchange of gunfire, and eleven ERP members were captured. Representatives from the Chilean MIR, Bolivian ELN and the Uruguayan MLN/T also escaped. Based on information provided by the prisoners and the captured documents, the Argentine authorities learned that a principle topic of discussion was the strategy which should be adopted by the ERP and the Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT), the political arm of the ERP, in confronting the new military government in Argentina. Of particular concern was the role the ERP and PRT should assume in future activities within the Argentine labor sector.

Among the captured documents was a paper presented by the Chilean MIR representative. The intact portion of the document focuses on the importance of learning from past experiences and mistakes of the various JCR member organizations. The MIR admitted that it had erred in anticipating a strong popular resistance to the military regime following the overthrow of President Salvador Allende, and that it under-evaluated weaknesses within its own organization, which were revealed each time the MIR attempted to take the initiative in military and political spheres against the Chilean government. According to the captured document,

4

SECRET

the MIR already has begun a more intensive effort to work through legal and semi-legal structures, and already has noted some progress in the last few months. No documents were available concerning the progress or future plans of the other JCR member organizations.

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

3.5(c) SECRET

			-	
_				
•	_	-		

Paraguay Arrests Terrorist Suspects Returning from Argentina

In early April Paraguayan security officers arrested, more than 70 persons suspected of receiving terrorist training in Argentina, according to the U.S. embassy in Asuncion. Those arrested included five Argentinians and one Uruguayan, as well as Paraguayan citizens. The round-up began when a known Paraguayan Communist was apprehended on 3 April as he attempted to enter Paraguay from Argentina. He provided information that led to other arrests. The authorities learned from these first prisoners that some 200 Paraguayan terrorists were in the process of moving back to Paraguay, most of them leaving Argentina in the wake of the recent coup there. They were said to be organized into several cells of around 20 to 25 persons each. Some of the arrests involved shoot-outs, and at least one terrorist leader and a policeman were killed.

The Ministry of Interior released a press statement on 7 April which claimed that the terrorists were members of the "Organizacion Politica Militar," linked to extremist groups in Argentina. The leaders were identified as Juan Carlos DaCosta del Castillo, described as a university agitator, who was killed in a shoot-out with the police, and Miguel Sanmarti Garcia, a Spanish Jesuit priest. According to other embassy information, Sanmarti was expelled from Paraguay in 1974 and is believed to be in Barcelona, Spain, although he may have returned to Paraguay. This group apparently was related, through support and training by the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), to a terrorist cell discovered in Asuncion in November 1974, which reportedly had planned to assassinate President Stroessner and conduct other terrorist operations. 3.5(c)

According to an Interior official, the returning terrorists were still in an organizational phase and had not developed specific plans for terrorist activity in Paraguay; they simply had to get out of Argentina. This official said the police seized quantities of modern small arms and bales of Marxist/Maoist publications.

3.5(c) 6

SECRET

3.5(c) ·

SECRET	
	3.5(c

A Paraguayan military intelligence official told several foreign military attaches that those arrested were mostly students, some from "good families," who had been studying at the Northeastern University in Corrientes, Argentina. They were not members of the ERP but had been trained and supported by it. He claimed that these returning students were prepared to begin extensive operations in April to obtain money and weapons by robbing banks, kidnapping, breaking into homes where weapons could be found, and attacking police stations to seize weapons. As this statement is not consistent with the information provided to the embassy by the Interior official, the military official may have exaggerated the danger somewhat when briefing the foreign attaches.

According to the embassy, Paraguayan authorities have assigned special guards to a number of foreign diplomatic missions, ostensibly for their protection. There is widespread belief in the diplomatic community, however, that these guards have been assigned primarily to prevent fugitives from seeking diplomatic asylum.

3.5(c)

3.5(c) 3.5(c) 7

SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C02630604



















SEP	DET
JEC.	KEL

3.5(c)

Target:	U.S. CITIZEN	The mother of a U.S. citizen residing in Cordoba received
Place:	Argentina, Cordoba	an extortion threat on 26 January when an unidentified

The mother of a U.S. citizen residing in Cordoba received an extortion threat on 26 January when an unidentified caller threatened that her daughter would be killed if he were not paid \$50,000 by 24 April.

3.5(c)

NR

3.5(c)

B-I-2

Date:

Late April 1976

SECRET

3.5(c)




















3.5(c)

Seeret




Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism

3.5(c)

20 April 1976

Secret 95

3.5(c)





















SECRET

3.5(c)

I. Terrorist Threats and Plans:

Western Hemisphere, Including the United States

Target:

U.S. CITIZEN

Place:

Argentina,

Cordoba

Date:

Late April 1976

The mother of a U.S. citizen residing in Cordoba received an extortion threat on 26

January when an unidentified caller threatened that her daughter would be killed if he were not paid \$50,000 by

24 April.

3.5(c)

Target:

U.S. EMBASSY

Place:

Argentina

Date:

April 1976

The "Red Brigade of Workers Power" is planning a terrorist

campaign beginning 2 April against several targets, one of which is the U.S. mission

in Argentina.

3.5(c)

NR

3.5(c)

SECRET

B-I-1

3.5(c)


^{**} Indicates a new threat reported for the first time.

^{*} Indicates a revision of a threat reported in previous issues.

















Seeret 3.5(c)




Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism

3.5(c)

27 April 1976

Secret 95

27 APR 1976



WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT

CONTENTS

	27	Apri1	1976	
Articles:				
Current Trends in Argentine Terrorism (Page 1)				
				NR
TAB B - Terrorist Threats and Plans				
TAD D TOTTOTTSC THICKES and Trans				
				NR
				3.5(c)

3.5(c)

SECRET

3.5(c)

ARTICLES

Current Trends in Argentine Terrorism

The military take-over in Argentina has not resulted in a decline in terrorist activity. Most observers on the scene feel that after an initial drop-off following the coup, terrorist operations have once again reached the precoup level. Most of the activity has centered around shoot-outs between the terrorists and the police and military. The terrorists are also conducting an assassination campaign which is primarily directed against police, security and military officials, although some businessmen have been targets as well.

The attacks against businessmen differ from previous campaigns in that the terrorists are currently murdering the businessmen rather than kidnapping them for ransom. For example, on 13 April, the two-man bodyguard team for the Argentine administrative manager of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company was ambushed and killed by the Montoneros while the bodyguards waited to escort their boss to work. On 14 April, the Argentine marketing manager for the Chrysler Corporation was machine-gunned to death when he answered his door. Attacks on businessmen have not been confined to foreign targets, so it does not appear that this campaign is directed specifically against foreign businesses.

Right now, the terrorists are engaging in high visibility, low risk, target of opportunity operations. Isolated police units, small military units and bodyguards would fall into this category. By attacking relatively soft targets spread over a large area, the terrorists hope to accomplish three things. First of all, the terrorists wish to demonstrate to their followers that they can still operate despite the military take-over. This will aid their recruiting efforts. Secondly, these operations are useful training exercises. Thirdly and most importantly, the terrorists hope to create the illusion that the instability in Argentina is greater than it really is, and thus provoke the military into taking harsh repressive measures, thereby alienating the Argentine population.

3.5(c)

SECRET

For the past two years, the main objective of the major Argentine terrorist organizations has been to provoke a military coup. Now that the coup has taken place, the terrorists' main aim is to provoke harsh repression, polarize the population and thus set the stage for revolution and civil war, which the terrorists theorize they will win. Further, the terrorists can widen their base of international support if they can equate the actions of the Argentine junta with the actions of the Chilean junta and thus score propaganda points for their cause by utilizing the theme that the military government is suppressing human rights.

What all this means for the near future is hard to say. If their current provocation campaign does not succeed, the terrorists may start to concentrate on more formal operations against higher-level, difficult targets such as government officials or foreign diplomats. These operations could be either assassinations or kidnappings. The probability of a major kidnapping operation will become greater if the government captures key terrorist leaders.

Foreign businesses may also become prime targets if the terrorists begin to run low on money.

3.3(b)(1)

the Montoneros are considering kidnapping executives of large and wealthy firms in order to obtain funds. It is also possible that by indiscriminately murdering businessmen, the terrorists are planning to start an extortion campaign, a tactic which they used quite successfully in 1973, and which required less preparation than a kidnapping operation.

Finally all the major terrorist organizations are attempting to gain recruits among the labor unions. Therefore any firm, foreign or domestic, that is experiencing labor troubles could become a prime target for a terrorist attack.

3.5(c)

2

SECRET



















SECRET

3.5(c)

I. Terrorist Threats and Plans:

Western Hemisphere, Including the United States

Target: Business ** The Montoneros plan to renew Executives operations to kidnap executives 3.3(b)(1) of large and wealthy firms in Place: Argentina order to obtain funds Date: Unknown did not specify if these would be Argentinian or foreign businessmen. 3.5(c)

Target: U.S. CITIZEN

Place: Argentina, Cordoba

D .

Date: Late April 1976

The mother of a U.S. citizen residing in Cordoba received an extortion threat on 26 January when an unidentified caller threatened that her daughter would be killed if he were not paid \$50,000 by 24 April.

3.5(c)

Target: U.S. EMBASSY

Place: Argentina

Date: April 1976

The "Red Brigade of Workers Power" is planning a terrorist campaign beginning 2 April against several targets, one of which is the U.S. mission in Argentina.

3.5(c)

3.5(c) SECRET 3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C02630604

^{**} Indicates a new threat reported for the first time.

^{*} Indicates a revision of a threat reported in previous issues.













